上市公司经营者股票期权激励问题探析.doc

摘要：股票期权激励作为一种有效解决企业委托代理问题的方法，由于效果明显，在美国等成熟市场被广泛应用。股票期权激励可以减少代理成本、吸引人才、留住人才、激励人才。我国A股上市公司的实证研究数据表明，股票期权激励这种股权激励方式在我国当前的现实条件下激励效果不明显,不能显著提高公司经营业绩,增加股东财富。股票期权激励这种激励方式应用于中国产生的激励效果远没有应用于美国明显。基于此，我们有必要探讨我国上市公司经营者股票期权激励中出现的问题。理论上，产生不同效果只会有三种可能性的影响因素差异：背景（实施环境的存在差异）、作用手段（具体的激励方案存在差异）和作用对象（接受股权激励的经营者差异）。本文从这三个方面对于美国和我国的差异进行细致的比较，并对差异为什么会产生不同激励效果进行了分析。对于解决股票期权激励不明显的问题，本文力图画出一个简单的框架。希望对于提高我国的股票期权激励效果可以从这三方面进行努力和改进。

关键字：股票期权激励； 激励效果； 影响因素； 差异分析

Abstract：Executive equity compensation and incentives, as an effective mechanism to solve business problems including how to reduce agency costs, attract and retain qualified personnel, develop a long-term incentives mechanism to motivate talented people, has been widely used, especially in the United States and other mature markets. The effect is obvious. However, according to China A-share listed companies’ empirical evidence, the incentive effect of executive equity compensation and incentive is not obvious. Executive holding does not significantly improve the company's operating performance and increase shareholder wealth. After the application of the same method produced different results, based on this, we need to explore the Listed Company stock option incentive issues that arise. In theory, there will only be three possibilities of influencing factors to produce different effects: Background (implementing environmental differences), the role of means (differences in specific incentive programs) and the role of the object (to accept equity incentive personnel difference). From this three aspects of the United States and China，this article conduct a careful comparison to analyze incentive effects. This paper seeks to draw a frame structure for improving the country's stock option incentive effects and solving the problem, that incentive effect of stock options is not obvious, through the efforts and improvements from the three aspects.

Keywords:  Incentive Stock Options; Incentive Effects; Listed Company; Differences Analysis